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Plural definite descriptions give rise to homogeneity effects: the positive The trucks
are blue and the negative The trucks aren’t blue are both neither true nor false
when some of the trucks are blue and some are not, that is, when the group of
trucks is not homogeneous with respect to the property of being blue (Löbner, 1987,
2000; Schwarzschild, 1994; Križ, 2015b). The only existing acquisition studies related
to the phenomenon have examined children’s comprehension only of the affirmative
versions of such sentences, and moreover have yielded conflicting data; while one
study reports that preschoolers interpret definite plurals maximally (Munn et al., 2006,
see also Royle et al., 2018), two other studies report that preschoolers allow non-
maximal interpretations of definite plurals where adults do not (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979;
Caponigro et al., 2012). Moreover, there is no agreed upon developmental trajectory
to adult homogeneity. In this paper, we turn to acquisition data to investigate the
predictions of a recent analysis of homogeneity that treats homogeneous meanings
as the result of a scalar implicature (Magri, 2014). We conducted two experiments
targeting 4- and 5-year-old French-speaking children’s interpretations of plural definite
descriptions in positive and negative sentences, and tested the same children on
standard cases of scalar implicature. The experiments revealed three distinct subgroups
of children: those who interpreted the plural definite descriptions existentially and failed
to compute implicatures; those who both accessed homogeneous interpretations and
computed implicatures; and finally, a smaller subgroup of children who appeared to
access homogeneous interpretations without computing implicatures. We discuss the
implications of our findings, which appear to speak against the implicature theory as the
adult-like means of generating homogeneous meanings.
Keywords: homogeneity, language acquisition, alternatives, scalar implicature, definite descriptions,
quantification, plurals, maximality
1. INTRODUCTION
Plural definite descriptions give rise to homogeneity effects (see among others, Fodor, 1970;
Schwarzschild, 1994; Löbner, 2000; Breheny, 2005; Gajewski, 2005; Büring and Križ, 2013; Spector,
2013; Magri, 2014; Križ, 2015a). The positive (1) is true in a situation where all of the trucks are
blue, but its negation (2) is only true in a situation where none of them are. There is a gap, however,
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FIGURE 1 | Image corresponding to a GAP context. The first and third trucks
are blue, while the second and fourth trucks are yellow.
in between these two possibilities; in a situation where some
but not all of the trucks are blue (Figure 1), neither the positive
sentence nor its negation are true. In this particular GAP context,
the group of trucks is not homogeneous with respect to the
property of being blue1.
(1) The trucks are blue.
(2) The trucks are not blue.
Now compare (1) and (2) to the universally quantified (3) and
(4). At first glance, the positive (1) might appear to be interpreted
roughly equivalently to the universally quantified (3). Yet this
apparent equivalency between the-NP and all-NP disappears
under negation: in contrast to (2), the negative (4) is true in the
scenario depicted in Figure 1.
(3) All of the trucks are blue.
(4) Not all of the trucks are blue.
The sentences with universal descriptions have complementary
negations: the set of situations in which the positive sentence
is true is the complement of the set of situations in which its
negation is true, with no gap between them.
One way of conceptualizing the state of affairs for the definite
descriptions is to say that in a GAP scenario, both the positive
and negative sentences are neither true nor false; rather they
correspond to a third truth value, or to none at all. Some
experimental evidence for this can be found in a study by Križ
and Chemla (2015), who presented adults with such sentences
as descriptions of situations that violated homogeneity. They
reported that adults often assessed such descriptions as neither
completely true nor completely false. In contrast, sentences
containing universal descriptions like (3) did not display this
gap, and were simply judged as completely false in the same
non-homogeneous scenarios.
In the present paper, we investigate the acquisition of such
truth value gaps. Building on Križ and Chemla (2015), we will
take the pattern they observed in adults as the empirical hallmark
1Note that homogeneity effects appear not only with definite plurals, but also when
a predicate is ascribed to a single object that has parts to which the predicate is
applicable: (ia) is true if the entire truck is blue, and (ib) is true if no appreciable
part of the truck is blue.
(i) a. The truck is blue.
b. The truck isn’t blue.
In this paper, however, we restrict our attention to the case of definite plurals.
of homogeneity: their adult participants assessed positive definite
descriptions and their negations as non-true in GAP contexts2.
Now, if young children do not initially display this hallmark
of homogeneity, one might expect them instead to assign
complementary truth conditions to the positive and negative
counterparts. In particular, one might expect children to liken
plural definite descriptions (5) to existential quantifiers (6) or to
universal quantifiers (7).
(5) a. The trucks are blue.
b. The trucks aren’t blue.
(6) a. There are some blue trucks.
b. There aren’t any blue trucks.
(7) a. Every truck is blue.
b. Not every truck is blue.
A child who is presented with (5) in a GAP context like
Figure 1, then, might be expected to respond in one of three
ways, depending on the interpretation assigned to the plural
definite. First, if the child is adult-like, she can be expected
to treat the positive and negative descriptions uniformly, likely
rejecting both as descriptions of GAP contexts. This possibility
corresponds to the HOMOGENEOUS pattern depicted in Figure 2.
Second, the child could interpret the definite existentially,
i.e., in parallel with (6), prompting her to accept the positive
sentence but not the negative sentence as a good description
of Figure 1. This corresponds to the EXISTENTIAL pattern
depicted in Figure 2. Third, the child could interpret the definite
universally, in line with (7), prompting her to accept the negative
but not the positive description, as in the UNIVERSAL pattern
in Figure 23.
To our knowledge, there are only three existing studies
that have specifically investigated children’s comprehension of
plural definite descriptions, examining in particular whether
children assign maximal interpretations to plural definite
descriptions. Karmiloff-Smith (1979) and Caponigro et al. (2012)
report corroborating findings that children allow non-maximal
interpretations of positive plural definite descriptions where
adults would not. Such children would be expected to accept a
sentence like (1) as a description of a context like Figure 1. While
these previous experiments leave open the status of negative
2Here and elsewhere in the paper, we will sometimes sloppily use the term definite
description to refer to a sentence containing a definite description in subject
position.
3This pattern seems particularly plausible when one considers the kinds of contexts
in which childrenmight hear the plural definite being uttered. If indeed the positive
(1) is only felicitous and true in contexts where all of the trucks are blue, the child
should only ever hear such descriptions in scenarios that satisfy homogeneity. This
could lead the child to form the generalization that plural definites have a universal
meaning. Some empirical evidence for this state of affairs in the caregiver input
may be found in corpus data reported by Caponigro et al. (2012). These authors
examined child-directed speech in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000),
and reported that all 6404 instances in their sample of plural definite descriptions
headed by the determiner the referred to a maximal element. Note that evidence
about negative plural definites may be more intricate, for reasons having to do
with scope; if a child only ever hears the negative (2) in homogeneous contexts, the
child might be led to liken the plural definite to a universal that must take wide
scope with respect to negation.
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FIGURE 2 | Expected response patterns for positive and negative definite descriptions such as The trucks are blue and The trucks aren’t blue in GAP contexts such as
Figure 1, according to the interpretation of the plural definite description.
descriptions like (2), a problem that we will address shortly, they
nevertheless provide a preliminary suggestion that children may
not be sensitive to the truth value gap described above.
Karmiloff-Smith (1979) and Caponigro et al. (2012) provide
different characterizations of their child participants’ failure to
enforce maximality in their interpretations of plural definite
descriptions, although neither characterization provides an
explanation of how children acquire maximality, nor of why
it emerges relatively late (reportedly after 6 years of age). To
date, there exists no unified explanation for these previous
findings. Since these two studies were conducted, however, a
recent semantic analysis of homogeneity has emerged which
invokes a connection between the homogeneity that is triggered
by plural definite descriptions and the enrichment mechanism
that underlies the derivation of scalar implicatures (Magri, 2014).
In what follows, we will investigate the precise predictions
that such an analysis makes for children’s development
both of homogeneity and scalar implicatures, through two
novel experiments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We will begin by briefly outlining the existing analyses of
homogeneity in the semantics literature. We will then review
the existing acquisition studies of plural definite descriptions,
which raise as-of-yet unanswered questions about children’s
early interpretations of plural definite descriptions and about
the learnability of homogeneity more generally. Since the scalar
implicature account makes concrete predictions that one can test,
we proceed to present two experiments where we did just that.
We then discuss the implications of our findings for a theory
of homogeneity and for the developmental trajectory toward
adult homogeneity4.
4A reviewer points out that the current study might also be seen as a contribution
to the broader investigation of the acquisition of predication, truth-value gaps,
and negation more generally, that is, above and beyond definite plurals. In what
follows, however, we will focus our attention specifically on how the child data can
be brought to bear on the implicature approach to the phenomenon.
2. THEORIES OF HOMOGENEITY
A few accounts of homogeneity have been proposed in the formal
semantics literature. The earliest proposals treat homogeneity as
a presupposition (Schwarzschild, 1994; Löbner, 2000; Gajewski,
2005). The general idea is that sentences like (1) and (2) carry a
presupposition that either all of the trucks are blue or none of
the trucks are blue. Since this presupposition is not satisfied in
GAP contexts like Figure 1, such descriptions give rise to a truth
value gap.
A second approach is to say that there is some sort of
indeterminacy or vagueness about the interpretation of the
definite description, which itself might be either existential or
universal. A sentence is then perceived as having a definite
truth value if it has the same truth value no matter how this
indeterminacy is resolved (Spector, 2013; Križ and Spector,
2017). For example, if the trucks in (1) can be interpreted either
existentially or universally, we have two possible interpretations
for the sentence:
(8) a. Some of the trucks are blue.
b. All of the trucks are blue.
The sentence in (1) is then true if both (8a) and (8b) are true,
i.e., if all of the trucks are blue, and false if both (8a) and (8b)
are false, i.e., if none of the trucks are blue. In Figure 1, neither
condition is satisfied, and so (1) can be neither true nor false.
The same reasoning applies to the negative sentence (2), since the
negations of (8a) and (8b) are neither both true nor both false.
A third approach derives homogeneity as a scalar implicature.
Magri (2014) proposes that plural definites have a literal
existential meaning that is strengthened to the universal meaning
through an implicature5. Take the example of the scalar
implicature in (9).
5We do not discuss here the very recent work by Bar-Lev (2018), which post-
dates the writing of this paper. Bar-Lev proposes to view homogeneity as an
implicature(-like) phenomenon in a way altogether different from Magri; the
experimental data we present will not bear directly on Bar-Lev’s approach.
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(9) a. Some of the trucks are blue.
b.  Not all of the trucks are blue
The implicature in (9b) arises as the consequence of comparing
the assertion in (9a) with alternatives that could have been uttered
but were not. Assuming speakers are as informative as they can
be (Grice, 1975), the speaker’s choice to utter (9a), as opposed
to the stronger alternative All of the trucks are blue, can lead
us to conclude that this stronger alternative is false, generating
the scalar implicature in (9b). This process by which the scalar
implicature is derived can be analyzed as involving a covert
exhaustification operator EXH, roughly equivalent to a silent
“only” (Fox, 2007; Chierchia et al., 2011):
(10) EXH(Some of the trucks are blue)
= Some of the trucks are blue and not all of the trucks are
blue
According to Magri (2014), homogeneity can be derived by
recursively applying this exhaustification procedure. Assume first
that the definite plural the trucks has a plain existential meaning,
much like some trucks in (9a). Assume further that the lexical
alternatives for the definite include “some” (though crucially not
“all”). Now if we apply the same exhaustification procedure as
in (10), but do so recursively, we effectively arrive at a universal
meaning for (1), as in (11).
(11) EXH(EXH(The trucks are blue))
= EXH(The trucks are blue) and NOT(EXH(some of the
trucks are blue))
= Some of the trucks are blue and NOT(some but not all
of the trucks are blue)
= All of the trucks are blue
Of the three accounts outlined above, the scalar implicature
account of homogeneity is of particular interest from a
developmental perspective, in part because there exists a
considerable amount of previous literature on the acquisition
of scalar implicatures. This previous work will afford us a
convenient means to empirically compare the two phenomena
in development, and in doing so, to test the predictions of
the theory6.
2.1. Testing the Predictions of the
Implicature Account
An implicature account of homogeneity prima facie predicts
that children should perform on homogeneity the way that
they perform on implicatures. After all, the same mechanism
would underlie the strengthened meaning of a scalar term like
“some” and the strengthened homogeneous meaning of a plural
definite description.
There have been a number of developmental studies focusing
on implicatures. Many of the existing studies have reported
6We have chosen to focus on the scalar implicature account primarily for practical
reasons, as there is more existing work on the acquisition of implicatures than
on the acquisition of vagueness or presupposition. We leave for future research
an investigation of the predictions that alternative accounts of homogeneity may
make for child language.
that children typically compute fewer scalar implicatures than
adults (see among many others, Braine and Rumain, 1981;
Chierchia et al., 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Noveck, 2001;
Papafragou andMusolino, 2003; Barner et al., 2011). More recent
developmental work on implicatures has shown that children’s
success on implicatures can in fact vary considerably, depending
on factors such as the methodology being used to test the child’s
knowledge of implicature, the particular scale being tested, and
the kinds of experimental contexts in which the scalar items
are presented. For example, Katsos and Bishop (2011) have
shown that providing 5-year-old children with three graded
response options vastly improves the children’s performance on
implicatures, compared to when they are presented with the
more traditional binary yes/no response options. That is, when
children are given the option to reward a puppet with a minimal,
intermediate, or maximal reward, they tend to perform in more
of an adult-like manner, offering the intermediate reward for
literally true but underinformative statements. Katsos and Bishop
(2011) propose that children are simply more pragmatically
tolerant than adults are when forced to decide whether or not to
accept an underinformative statement.
Another proposal that has gained traction in the
developmental literature is the idea that children’s performance
on implicatures is somehow linked to the nature of the
alternatives that are involved in computing the implicature, with
potential difficulties arising from accessing lexical alternatives or
understanding their relevance in a given context (Barner et al.,
2011; Singh et al., 2016; Skordos and Papafragou, 2016; Tieu
et al., 2016). In particular, children appear to exhibit greater
difficulties with implicatures that involve lexical replacement of
alternative scalar terms, e.g., some/all, or/and, and might/must.
By contrast, children have been reported to successfully compute
ad hoc implicatures (“My friend has glasses” My friend doesn’t
have both glasses and a hat) (Stiller et al., 2015) and free choice
inferences (“Kungfu Panda may push the green car or the red
car” Kungfu Panda may push the green car and Kungfu Panda
may push the red car) (Tieu et al., 2016), as well as conjunctive
inferences from disjunction (“The chicken pushed a bus or
an airplane”  The chicken pushed a bus and an airplane)
(Singh et al., 2016; Tieu et al., 2017). These inferences share
a common property: they do not involve lexical replacement;
rather, children can retrieve the required alternatives directly
from the test sentences or from the experimental context.
Given the insights of these recent studies on implicatures,
we will set out to test the implicature account of homogeneity
in a carefully controlled, systematic way, keeping in mind
the role that alternatives, methodology, and context can play.
We will systematically compare homogeneity to an implicature
that, on the implicature theory, actually corresponds to a sub-
computation of the homogeneity implicature [recall that (10) is
a sub-computation of (11)]. Importantly, we will also use exactly
the same tasks and contexts to test the two phenomena. This
means that whatever effect the context may have on the one,
it should also have the same effect on the other. Moreover,
because the lexical alternatives involved in generating the not-all
implicature and the homogeneity implicature are the very same,
i.e., “some” and “all”, we do not have to worry that children
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may acquire the alternatives for one inference earlier than for
the other. In fact, the implicature theory in this case makes very
straightforward, testable predictions.
If homogeneity is derived using the same mechanism as
classical scalar implicatures, one should expect children to
display sensitivity to homogeneity only once they are able
to compute scalar implicatures, and more specifically only
once they are able to compute the not-all implicature, since
this corresponds to a sub-computation of the implicature of
homogeneity. Previous studies have shown that without special
training or facilitation, preschoolers typically respond to “some”
statements in a manner consistent with the literal existential
interpretation of the quantifier (e.g., Papafragou and Musolino,
2003). The implicature theory therefore predicts a similar pattern
for homogeneity for such children, namely literal, existential
interpretations of plural definite descriptions. Only once the
children are capable of computing the not-all implicature will
they display homogeneity effects. Furthermore, the implicature
that gives rise to homogeneity effects involves recursive
application of the exhaustification operator, so one might expect
to see homogeneity surface even later in development than the
regular first-order not-all implicature.While there is independent
evidence that children are capable of recursive exhaustification
(Zhou et al., 2013; Tieu et al., 2016), crucially, the timing
prediction remains the same: we should not observe homogeneity
surfacing before the scalar implicature.
3. ACQUISITION OF HOMOGENEITY
While there are existing studies of the acquisition of definite noun
phrases on the one hand (see among others,Maratsos, 1974, 1976;
Schafer and de Villiers, 2000; Matthewson et al., 2001; Pérez-
Leroux et al., 2004; Schaeffer and Matthewson, 2005; Schmerse
et al., 2014), and of plurality on the other hand (e.g., Berko, 1958;
Winitz et al., 1981; Mervis and Johnson, 1991; Marcus et al., 1992;
Fenson et al., 1994; Marchman et al., 1997; Sauerland et al., 2005;
Barner et al., 2007; Zapf and Smith, 2008; Wood et al., 2009; Tieu
et al., 2014; Davies et al., 2016), few studies have examined the
two phenomena in conjunction. To our knowledge, there are only
three existing studies that have specifically investigated children’s
comprehension of plural definite descriptions.
3.1. Karmiloff-Smith (1979)
In the earliest of these studies, Karmiloff-Smith (1979) reports
a series of experiments investigating French-speaking children’s
production and comprehension of different kinds of noun
phrases, including definite plural noun phrases. Two of
Karmiloff-Smith’s studies are relevant for our purposes here.
First, she conducted a production study in which a child
was prompted to produce directives, such as Il faut mettre
les camions dans le garage “One must put the trucks in the
garage.” The experimental set-up involved two experimenters.
One experimenter (E2) would turn his back and close his
eyes. The other experimenter (E1) would manipulate a series of
objects, for example, moving a set of toy trucks into the garage.
The child would then have to tell E2 what he would have to
do to replicate that action. E1 would return the objects to their
original locations, and E2 would then turn around and open his
eyes, and carry out the action based on the child’s directive. By
manipulating what sets of objects were moved into the garage,
the experimenters aimed to elicit different kinds of noun phrases
from the child, e.g., les camions “the trucks,” mes camions “my
trucks,” les camions bleus “the blue trucks,” etc. The experimenters
tested children between the ages of 4;07 and 11;05. Karmiloff-
Smith reports that for 4- and 5-year-olds, the definite article les
was used to mark pluralization but not “totalization”; that is,
les X was taken to signify any plural amount of X’s, though not
necessarily all the X’s.
In a comprehension experiment modeled similarly to the
production experiment, children were on the receiving end of
the directives, and had to manipulate toy objects in response to
these directives. For instance, they would hear sentences such as
Mets les voitures au garage “Put the cars in the garage.” Karmiloff-
Smith reports low percentages of correct responses from 4- and
5-year-olds, suggesting again that the definite les X for these
children signified any plurality of X’s, though not necessarily
the full set of X’s. More generally, Karmiloff-Smith proposes
that children initially mark newly acquired functions, such as
pluralization, or totalization, through separate morphemes. In
the earliest stage, between 3 and 5.5 years of age, children
associate the plural definite les only with pluralization. In a
second stage, between 5 and 8 years of age, children add the
universal marker tous ‘all’ to convey totalization. Finally, after
the age of 8 years, the definite plural les comes to simultaneously
convey pluralization and totalization.
While Karmiloff-Smith’s (1979) data are suggestive of what
we have referred to in section 1 as the EXISTENTIAL pattern of
interpretation, notice that the experiments she reports did not
include plural definite descriptions under negation. The study
therefore leaves open the status of children’s interpretation of the
negations of such plural definite descriptions, and does not allow
us to fully determine which of the three scenarios in Figure 2 the
child’s initial state corresponds to.
3.2. Munn et al. (2006)
The second study that has examined children’s understanding of
plural definite descriptions is reported in Munn et al. (2006).
These authors compared children’s understanding of singular
and plural definite descriptions and indefinite nominals in
English and Spanish. Like Karmiloff-Smith’s comprehension
study, Munn et al.’s study employed an act-out task. Preschoolers
(mean age 4;01) were issued requests, such as “give me the frogs
next to the barn”, where there was a set of toy frogs beside a
toy barn. The authors report that almost all children gave the
maximal element of the relevant set of frogs 95% of the time7. In
contrast to the conclusions reached in Karmiloff-Smith (1979),
7Royle et al. (2018) report a replication of Munn et al.’s study in French, using the
same act-out task to test (Canadian) French-speaking children’s comprehension of
requests such as:Donne-moi les vaches qui sont à côté de la ferme “Give me the cows
that are beside the farm.” Children and adults generally gave maximal responses
to definite plurals, with a significant effect of age observed for the children: the
youngest children provided ∼37% non-maximal responses while older children
gave∼10% non-maximal responses (Royle et al., 2018:7).
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the authors conclude that children correctly interpret plural
definite descriptions maximally by the age of 3 years.
As pointed out in later work by Caponigro et al. (2010, 2012),
however, there are some issues with this study. First, there were
no control trials involving descriptions such as some of the frogs,
so it is not clear whether children would also select the maximal
set for such requests. Second, Caponigro et al. (2010) point out
that Munn et al.’s reported percentage of maximal responses was
calculated after excluding children who gave only one item in
response to the plural definite description request; these children
were clearly not assigning a maximal interpretation to the plural
definite description. Third, Caponigro et al. (2012) point out
that since Munn et al. (2006) did not provide a breakdown
of the data by age, it is difficult to draw conclusions about
when maximality in plural definite descriptions is acquired.
Finally, like Karmiloff-Smith’s (1979) study, this study, too,
leaves open the status of children’s interpretation of the negative
definite description counterparts, without which we cannot tell
whether the reported “maximal” behavior is due to an adult
(homogeneous) interpretation of the plural definite description,
or merely to a universal interpretation of the definite description.
3.3. Caponigro et al. (2012)
Caponigro et al. (2010, 2012) set out to investigate the possible
developmental connection between plural definite descriptions
like the things on the plate and free relative clauses like what
is on the plate. The authors first conducted a Truth Value
Judgment Task (TVJT) (Crain and Thornton, 1998) with 4-, 5-,
6-, and 7-year-old children, and a group of adult controls. In
this task, participants were introduced to a character (Cookie
Monster) who loves cookies but strongly dislikes onions. On
critical target trials, children were presented with a picture of
a plate containing three cookies and three onions, and were
asked questions such as “Does Cookie Monster like the things
on the plate?” or “Does Cookie Monster like what’s on the plate?”
The authors report that overall, free relatives and plural definite
descriptions were interpreted maximally more frequently than
existential nominals containing one and some, but less frequently
than those containing the universal all8. As the authors point out,
there are a couple of reasons to pursue the investigation further.
First, even the adult controls that they tested did not always access
maximal readings for the plural definite descriptions and free
relatives, making it difficult to assess children’s performance on
the task. The authors suggest the problem may lie in the nature
of the TVJT; they reason that if the plural definite descriptions
introduced a presupposition of homogeneity, this presupposition
was necessarily violated on the critical “mixed plate” trials, and
so there could be no true or false answer given to the critical test
questions. A second issue that the authors point out is that up
until age 7, participants’ responses to the critical trials were not
different from chance; it is therefore unclear whether participants
were simply guessing at random. Finally, as we pointed out
previously for Munn et al.’s study, a maximal answer to positive
sentences could be obtained either through homogeneity, or
8See Modyanova and Wexler (2008) for further evidence of non-maximal
interpretations of free relatives.
through a mere universal (non-adult-like) interpretation of the
plural definite description.
To address the potential felicity issue with the use of the TVJT,
the authors next conducted an act-out task, again with 4-, 5-,
6-, and 7-year-olds, and adult controls. In this task, participants
were issued requests such as “Can you give me the things on
the plate?” and “Can you give me what’s on the plate?” The
authors also compared the target conditions with ones in which
the request contained some, all, and the nonsense determiner
blick. Two of their main findings are relevant for us here. First,
the authors reported a significant main effect of Question Type,
with plural definite description responses differing from those in
the some and all conditions. Second, further analysis revealed
that the responses of the 4- and 5-year-olds, but not those of
the 6- and 7-year-olds, were significantly different from those
of adults; crucially, 4- and 5-year-olds assigned fewer maximal
interpretations to the plural definite descriptions than the older
children or the adults.
Caponigro et al. propose that although young children are
capable of representing plural individuals, they struggle to map
the conceptual/semantic representations of plural individuals
to the relevant linguistic structure. These authors assume that
the definite determiner denotes a function that applies to a
set of individuals and returns the maximal element of that
set (Link, 1983). They propose that young children associate
the plural noun phrase with a set containing a plurality of
atomic individuals, but one that contains no plural individuals
or maximal individual. The meaning of the cannot apply to a
set lacking a maximal individual, and so the semantic derivation
fails, leading to the absence of maximal interpretations. The
authors suggest that 4-year-olds must adopt other (possibly non-
grammatical) strategies to deal with this failure, and point to the
fact that their 4-year-olds treated the plural definite descriptions
the same as they did the nonsense determiner blick.
3.4. Taking Stock
The previous acquisition studies described above tackled
the question of whether young children enforce maximal
interpretations on plural definite descriptions. The findings
of Karmiloff-Smith (1979) and Caponigro et al. (2012) align,
revealing that both French- and English-speaking children fail
to interpret plural definite descriptions maximally until at least
6 years of age.
The findings of both of these studies raise three important
questions. First, what underlies young children’s non-maximal
interpretations of plural definite descriptions? Second, what is
the developmental trajectory that children take toward maximal
interpretations? Finally, what triggers maximal interpretations,
and so late in development? The two studies that report non-
maximal behavior do not readily provide an answer to the
third question, nor do they agree on the answers to the
first two questions. On Karmiloff-Smith’s proposal, children
in the earliest stages associate the plural definite description
with plurality, and not maximality. Children subsequently
develop knowledge of the totalization function, and only later
allow the plurifunctional/simultaneous marking of pluralization
and totalization through the same morpheme. On Caponigro
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et al.’s proposal, children initially fail to access maximal
interpretations because they associate the plural noun phrase
with a set of plural atomic individuals that lacks a maximal
individual.What is missing, the authors speculate, is an adult-like
mapping between the target linguistic structure and the relevant
conceptual representation.
The finding that young children as a group do not interpret
plural definite descriptions as maximally as adults do, does not
rule out the possibility that they nevertheless interpret these
expressions in systematic ways, and in particular, in a manner
consistent with one of the possibilities presented in Figure 2.
Unfortunately, none of the previous studies allow us to determine
which scenario in Figure 2 young children fall into, since
these studies did not examine plural definite descriptions under
negation9. Moreover, the data from these previous studies hint
at more than one possibility. Specifically, Karmiloff-Smith’s and
Caponigro et al.’s participants who gave non-maximal responses
could conceivably have assigned an existential interpretation to
the plural definite description; Munn et al.’s participants, who
gave maximal responses, could have interpreted the definite
plural either universally or homogeneously. The first goal of
our study, then, is to resolve this uncertainty surrounding the
interpretations children assign to plural definite descriptions.
In order to do so, we will examine children’s interpretation of
plural definite descriptions in both positive (upward-entailing)
and negative (downward-entailing) declarative sentences. By
examining individual participants’ pairs of responses to both
positive and negative plural definite descriptions in gap contexts,
we will be able to identify whether they are assigning a
homogeneous, existential, or universal interpretation to the
plural definite descriptions.
The second main goal of the study is to pursue a
characterization of the developmental trajectory to adult
homogeneity, by investigating a potential connection with scalar
implicatures. We will test Magri’s (2014) scalar implicature
theory of homogeneity through acquisition, by directly
comparing individual children’s performance on the two
phenomena, using minimally different stimuli. In particular, we
will investigate the timeline predictions that the account makes,
specifically that we may observe the concurrent emergence of
homogeneity and the some-but-not-all scalar implicature, or
the emergence of the scalar implicature before homogeneity,
but crucially not the emergence of homogeneity before the
scalar implicature10.
9In fact, Caponigro et al.’s proposal would appear to suggest that young children
don’t initially fall into any of the three categories, or at least not systematically so.
10The reader might wonder whether Caponigro et al.’s (2012) some conditions
could potentially speak to children’s ability to compute scalar implicatures. The
authors reported the percentage of maximal responses to some; notice that a
maximal response would be consistent with the literal some-or-all meaning of the
existential quantifier, but not with the some-but-not-all scalar implicature. Given
this, it is striking to note that even 4- and 5-year-olds gave very few maximal
responses in the some condition. This finding cannot be taken as conclusive
evidence of calculation of the scalar implicature, however, for a couple of reasons.
First, in an act-out task, participants may be driven to take the minimal action
to satisfy a request; a less-than-maximal response, which involves less effort,
would still be compatible with the literal interpretation of some. Second, in any
given session, children were presented with requests containing some and requests
A final difference we should point out between the previous
studies and the present one concerns the tasks presented to
the children. The production, act-out, and truth value judgment
tasks used in Karmiloff-Smith (1979), Munn et al. (2006), and
Caponigro et al. (2012) all involved some degree of reasoning
about someone else’s desires and actions. On the act-out tasks,
children had to satisfy the demands of an issued request; they
therefore had to decide howmuch action they would have to take
in order to satisfy the speaker’s desires. On the production task,
children had to decide howmuch information to give in order for
a third party to successfully carry out an action the way a second
party had modeled it. On the TVJT, children had to assess the
depicted scenarios against Cookie Monster’s likes and dislikes.
We make no claims about how adept children are at this kind
of reasoning; we will, however, attempt to avoid this extra step
entirely, and simplify the task by asking children to judge very
simple descriptions of pictures of familiar objects.
4. EXPERIMENT 1
We designed a Truth Value Judgment Task to assess the
interpretations that adults and children assign to positive
and negative sentences containing plural definite descriptions.
Participants’ responses to the positive and negative descriptions
in GAP contexts would allow us to determine whether they
interpreted the definite plural homogeneously, existentially,
or universally. To investigate the predictions of the scalar
implicature account of homogeneity (Magri, 2014), we also
tested participants’ interpretation of some-sentences in contexts
that made the not-all implicature false. The direct comparison
between homogeneity and scalar implicatures would allow
us to assess the potential developmental connection between
homogeneity and scalar implicatures.
4.1. Methods
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the CERES
(“Comité d’évaluation éthique des projets de recherche en santé
non soumis à CPP”) under approval number 2013/46. Written
informed consent was obtained from the parents or guardians
of all child participants; adult participants were tested through
an anonymous web-based survey, and had to click a button to
provide informed consent before starting the experiment.
4.1.1. Participants
We tested 24 French-speaking children (13 female) (4; 04, 15 −
5; 03, 24,M = 4; 09) at two preschools in Paris. Two additional
children were excluded because they answered fewer than six
of eight control trials correctly (trials in which a sentence
containing all. Children could therefore have inferred that the use of some should
elicit a different response from the use of all. Children have indeed been shown
to be able to differentiate weak from strong scalar terms; such a finding, however,
only establishes sensitivity to relative informativity, and may not necessarily signal
the computation of implicatures (for relevant discussion, see Chierchia et al.,
2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Katsos and Bishop, 2011). Finally, we should make
it very clear here that Caponigro et al. (2012) do not seek to make any claims
about children’s scalar implicatures. We simply point out here that although they
included an existential quantification condition, we cannot draw on their results to
make strong conclusions about children’s performance on scalar implicatures.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 November 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2329
Tieu et al. Children’s Acquisition of Homogeneity
with a definite description was made uncontroversially true or
uncontroversially false). The inclusion criterion of 75% accuracy
on controls is fairly standard in truth value judgment task
experiments of this kind, and was decided upon prior to testing.
We also tested 22 adult native speakers of French, recruited
through the online platform FouleFactory, at a total cost of
AC57.60. All adults passed the controls and were included in
the analysis.
4.1.2. Procedure
Children were introduced to a puppet named Raffie the Giraffe,
who interacted via webcam. Children were told that Raffie was
still very little, and not very good at paying attention. They
were then presented with a series of pictures, each containing
four objects, and were asked to identify the colors of each of
the four objects. The puppet was then asked to say something
about the objects, and would utter a test sentence containing a
plural definite noun phrase (e.g., les ballons “the balloons”), an
existentially quantified noun phrase (e.g., certains ballons “some
balloons”), or a universally quantified noun phrase (e.g., tous les
ballons “all of the balloons”). Children had to judge the puppet’s
description and indicate their judgment by stamping on a score
sheet, either under a happy face or a sad face.
Children were tested individually away from their classrooms.
Responses were videorecorded for subsequent analysis. Children
saw two training items involving the description of single,
colored objects (i.e., a pink chair and a green piano), followed
by 24 test trials presented in one of two pseudorandomized
orders, one the reverse of the other (the order of presentation was
counterbalanced across participants). The total task took roughly
10 min for children to complete.
Adults were tested on a web-based version of the task; the
procedure and the visual stimuli were the same, but the sentences
were presented visually (in the form of speech bubbles beside the
puppet’s picture) rather than orally. Adult participants indicated
their responses by clicking on appropriate yes/no buttons.
4.1.3. Materials
As we will describe in more detail below, participants
received two training items, six homogeneity targets, eight
uncontroversially true/false plural definite description controls,
six universal quantification controls, and four scalar implicature
targets. The full set of test sentences is provided in theAppendix.
Homogeneity targets. Participants heard three positive and
three negative les “the”-NP sentences such as (12), presented
in GAP contexts such as Figure 3, in which only two of the
four objects in the image were of the color indicated in the
test sentence11.
11We varied the objects described and the colors of the objects in order to keep
the task engaging for young children. We selected simple objects and colors that
preschool-aged children would be familiar with, and ensured that pairs of colors
were discernible for any colorblind participants. Children were also asked to
verbally identify the objects (Qu’est-ce que tu vois sur cette image? “What do you see
in this picture?”) and the colors of these objects. We did not systematically control
for gender but aimed for a rough balance of masculine and feminine nouns across
the experiment; of the six critical homogeneity targets, three were feminine (les
voitures, les étoiles, les balles) and three were masculine (les ballons, les camions, les
coeurs).
FIGURE 3 | Example of an image presented in the GAP condition. The first and
third hearts are red, while the second and fourth hearts are yellow. The
corresponding homogeneity target sentence was either Les coeurs sont
rouges “The hearts are red” or Les coeurs ne sont pas rouges “The hearts are
not red”.
(12) a. Les coeurs sont rouges.
“The hearts are red.”
b. Les coeurs ne sont pas rouges.
“The hearts are not red.”
If children treated the plural definite description as imposing
homogeneity, they were expected to reject both the positive
and the negative the-sentence, in accordance with the
HOMOGENEOUS pattern in Figure 2. If children interpreted
the definite plural existentially, they were expected to accept
the positive the-sentence but to reject the negative the-
sentence. In contrast, if they interpreted it universally,
they were expected to reject the positive but to accept the
negative sentence. Participants saw three repetitions of
the positive definite descriptions and three repetitions of
the negative.
Homogeneity controls. In addition to the six homogeneity
targets, participants also heard four positive and four negative
definite descriptions like (13), presented in contexts that satisfied
homogeneity (Figure 4); these allowed us to ensure that children
understood basic plural definite descriptions, and in particular,
could provide yes- and no-responses appropriately when there
were no issues of non-homogeneity. In ALL contexts, where
all of the objects shared the same color, the positive control
was associated with a yes-target, and the negative with a no-
target. In NONE contexts, where none of the objects had
the color indicated in the test sentence, the positive definite
description was associated with a no-target, and the negative with
a yes-target.
(13) a. Les parapluies sont rouges.
“The umbrellas are red.”
b. Les parapluies ne sont pas rouges.
“The umbrellas are not red.”
The targets for these definite control trials were selected
dynamically based on children’s responses to the target sentences.
Every third trial corresponded to a dynamic control, for which
the experimenter could select either the yes- or the no-target.
This precaution allowed us to ensure that participants could give
both yes- and no-responses where appropriate, and allowed us
to avoid overly long sequences of successive yes- and no-targets,
which otherwise might encourage a yes- or no-bias, respectively
(for previous examples of the use of such dynamic fillers, see
Musolino and Lidz, 2006; Conroy et al., 2009; Tieu and Lidz,
2016; Lewis et al., 2017). Any participant who failed to correctly
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FIGURE 4 | Images corresponding to the plural definite description control condition. When accompanied by the image on the left, in which all four umbrellas are red,
the positive and negative descriptions in (13) would be associated with a yes- and a no-target, respectively. When accompanied by the image on the right, in which all
four umbrellas are blue, the positive and negative sentences in (13) would be associated with a no- and a yes-target, respectively.
answer at least six of the eight definite plural controls was
excluded from analysis.
Finally, we included a universal quantification condition,
which contained three positive and three negative universally
quantified descriptions such as (14), presented in GAP contexts
such as Figure 3. These would allow us to ensure that children
could assign an adult-like, negation-preserving meaning to
universally quantified sentences, and would provide a point of
comparison for the plural definite descriptions.
(14) a. Tous les coeurs sont rouges.
“All the hearts are red.”
b. Pas tous les coeurs sont rouges.
“Not all the hearts are red.”12
Scalar implicature targets. To assess Magri’s (2014) scalar
implicature-based account of homogeneity, we also administered
a scalar implicature test. Participants received four scalar
implicature trials, which involved existentially quantified certains
“some”-sentences, presented in contexts where all four objects
displayed were of the mentioned color (Figure 5). If participants
computed the some-but-not-all implicature, they were expected
to reject the test sentences. If they accessed only the literal
plain existential meaning of the sentences, however, they were
expected to accept the descriptions. This condition would
allow us to directly compare participants’ performance on
homogeneity and scalar implicatures.
Summary of the materials. In all, participants received two
training items, six homogeneity targets, eight uncontroversially
true/false plural definite description controls, six universal
12Some native speakers of French may not find the negative (14b) to be an entirely
natural formulation. We chose to place the negation before the universal quantifier
for three reasons. First, a natural alternative would have been to float the universal
quantifier, as in Les coeurs ne sont pas tous rouges “The hearts are not all red.”
But we chose to avoid any potential issues related to children’s mastery of floating
quantification. Second, if we kept the universal quantifier in its unfloated position,
as in Tous les coeurs (ne) sont pas rouges “All of the hearts are not red,” there was
a question of whether children might be sensitive to the presence or absence of
the ne. If, for whatever reason, participants failed to perceive the ne, for example,
this could have invited an interpretation where the negation was phrasal rather
than sentential, e.g., Les coeurs sont [pas-rouges] “The hearts are [not-red].” Finally,
the version where pas precedes tous gives rise to the rather strong indirect scalar
implicature that some of the hearts are red, which would serve to further emphasize
the absence of homogeneity depicted in the test image.
FIGURE 5 | Example of an image presented in the scalar implicature target
condition. All four of the tents are orange, while the corresponding test
sentence was Certaines tentes sont oranges “Some tents are orange.”
quantification controls, and four scalar implicature targets. The
full set of test sentences is provided in the Appendix.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Plural Definite Descriptions
Figure 6 displays the percentage of yes-responses for the
homogeneity targets, in between the true and false definite
description controls. While children were adult-like with respect
to the definite description controls, the two groups differed in
their treatment of the definite plural in GAP contexts. Unlike
the adults, the children showed some acceptance of the positive
definite descriptions in gap contexts; a mixed effects logistic
regression model of responses as predicted by polarity revealed
that they accepted the positive targets significantly more than
they did the negative targets (p < 0.001) (lme4 package for R,
R Core Team, 2016, Bates et al., 2015).
That children behaved differently from adults indicates
that the child participants as a group were non-adult-like
in their interpretation of the definite plural; but we wished
to explore further how they might be interpreting the plural
definite descriptions. Previous studies have hinted at existential,
universal, and homogeneous possibilities, but these studies
were inconclusive in this respect due to the absence of
negative definite description targets. To further explore the
possible interpretive preferences, we categorized participants
according to their responses to both the positive and negative
homogeneity targets. A participant was categorized as exhibiting
the HOMOGENEOUS response pattern if they rejected at least two
of three positive homogeneity targets and at least two of three
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FIGURE 6 | Percentage of yes-responses to the plural definite description targets and controls. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the within-participant
means. Homogeneity targets corresponded to plural definite descriptions of GAP contexts. Clearly true controls corresponded to positive plural definite descriptions of
ALL contexts and negative plural definite descriptions of NONE contexts. Clearly false controls corresponded to positive plural definite descriptions of NONE contexts
and negative plural definite descriptions of ALL contexts.
TABLE 1 | Distribution of participants according to their performance on
homogeneity and scalar implicature targets.
Adults Children
− Implicature + Implicature − Implicature + Implicature
Homogeneous 5 10 6 10
Existential 0 0 7 1
Universal 5 1 0 0
negative homogeneity targets. A participant was categorized as
exhibiting the EXISTENTIAL response pattern if they accepted
at least two of three positive homogeneity targets, and rejected
at least two of three negative homogeneity targets. Finally,
a participant was categorized as displaying the UNIVERSAL
response pattern if they rejected at least two of three positive
homogeneity targets, and accepted at least two of three negative
homogeneity targets13.
Table 1 displays the distribution of participants in the
different response categories, based on their performance
on the homogeneity and scalar implicature targets. Some
readers would prefer an alternative analysis that does not
bin participants into categories; we include this discussion
here as an exploration of the possible interpretive profiles.
As it turns out, our participants aligned rather strikingly into
a subset of the possible categories. Let us first focus on
the homogeneity targets. Sixteen of the 22 adult participants
displayed the HOMOGENEOUS pattern of responses, rejecting
13We chose to have three repetitions of each of the positive and negative
homogeneity targets so as to keep the overall length of the experiment manageable
for children; but a future study might ideally include more target trials, to
ensure that a participant’s categorization under this scheme truly reflects their
interpretation of the definite description. In this respect, however, it is worth
noting that our child participants were remarkably consistent in their responses
to the targets, with only two of the children giving non-uniform responses (to the
positive targets).
both positive and negative definite descriptions in GAP contexts,
while six adult participants displayed the UNIVERSAL response
pattern, accepting the negative targets but rejecting the positive
targets. Children treated the homogeneity targets differently
from the adult group: sixteen of the 24 children displayed the
HOMOGENEOUS pattern of responses, while the remaining eight
children displayed the EXISTENTIAL response pattern (χ2(2,N =
46) = 13.94, p < 0.001). No adult displayed the EXISTENTIAL
response pattern and no child displayed the UNIVERSAL
response pattern.
We also elicited follow-up justifications following children’s
responses. The explanations that children provided indicate that
they were generally consistent in their responses to the target
conditions. Children consistently rejected the negative plural
definite descriptions in GAP contexts, justifying their answers by
pointing out the objects that had the color mentioned by the
puppet, as in (15).
(15) Justifications for rejecting negative homogeneity targets
a. Les camions ne sont pas bleus. “The trucks are not
blue”
CHI: (Non) parce qu’il y en a des bleus
“(No) because there are blue ones” (C03-A, age
4;09,20)
b. Les camions ne sont pas bleus. “The trucks are not
blue”
CHI: (Non) parce que les camions ils sont bleus et
jaunes
“(No) because the trucks are blue and yellow” (C05-
A, age 4;09,21)
c. Les balles ne sont pas rouges. “The balls are not red”
CHI: Pas vrai. Il y en a qui sont rouges
“Not true. There are some that are red” (C07-B, age
4;11,19)
The yes-responses observed in the positive definite GAP condition
were primarily elicited from eight children who consistently
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accepted in this condition. These children justified their yes-
responses by pointing out the objects that were of the color
mentioned by the puppet, as in (16).
(16) Justifications for accepting positive homogeneity targets
a. Les ballons sont rouges. “The balloons are red”
CHI: (Oui) elle a dit qu’ils sont rouges
“(Yes) she said they’re red” (C02-B, age 4;04,15)
b. Les ballons sont rouges. “The balloons are red”
CHI: (Oui) parce qu’il y en a deux rouges
“(Yes) because there are two red ones” (C03-A, age
4;09,20)
c. Les voitures sont bleues. “The cars are blue”
CHI: (Oui) elle a raison, elle a dit les voitures elles
sont bleues
“(Yes) she’s right, she said the cars are blue” (C09-A,
age 4;05,09)
The HOMOGENEOUS children who rejected the positive
homogeneity targets justified their responses by drawing
attention to the objects that were of the color not mentioned by
the puppet, as in (17).
(17) Justifications for rejecting positive homogeneity
targets14
a. Les ballons sont rouges. “The balloons are red”
CHI: (Non) parce qu’ils sont rouges et bleus
“(No) because they are red and blue” (C05-A, age
4;09,21)
b. Les étoiles sont jaunes. “The stars are yellow”
CHI: (Non) parce qu’elle a oublié les rouges !
“(No) because she forgot the red ones” (C07-B, age
4;11,19)
c. Les voitures sont bleues. “The cars are blue”
CHI: (Non) c’est pas tout bleu
“(No) it’s not all blue” (C12-B, age 4;07,14)
4.2.2. Scalar Implicatures
Children’s performance in the scalar implicature condition
was comparable with that of the adult participants: children
rejected the existentially quantified descriptions of ALL contexts
46% of the time, while adults did so 50% of the time. The
distribution of adult and child participants according to their
performance on homogeneity and scalar implicature targets is
summarized in Table 1. An examination of individual children’s
responses in this condition revealed two groups of children: those
who consistently failed to compute the implicature, accepting
on at least three of four implicature trials, and those who
consistently computed the implicature, rejecting on at least three
of four implicature trials. Eleven of the 24 children consistently
computed implicatures, providing justifications consistent with
the strengthened meaning of the sentences:
14Some of these justifications could be consistent with rejections not for non-
homogeneity but rather for a failure to completely describe all of the objects in
the picture. That is, the puppet only accurately described half of the objects. It is
difficult to tease apart the two kinds of rejections here. Experiment 2 will include a
control that allows us to address this potential concern.
(18) Justifications consistent with calculation of scalar
implicature
a. Certains chapeaux sont roses. “Some hats are pink”
CHI: (Non) tous les chapeaux sont roses
“(No) all of the hats are pink” (C10-B, age 4;10,12)
b. Certains chapeaux sont roses. “Some hats are pink”
CHI: (Non) parce qu’elle a dit certains [. . . ] j’aurais
dit qu’ils sont tous roses
“(No) because she said some [. . . ] I would have said
they’re all pink” (C11-A, age 5;00,05)
c. Certaines tentes sont oranges. “Some tents are
orange”
CHI: Oh non, parce qu’elles sont toutes oranges
“Oh no, because they’re all orange” (C13-B, age
4;09,16)
In all, 13 of the 24 children failed to compute scalar implicatures,
accepting on at least three of the four scalar implicature trials.
Seven of these children were among the eight children who
displayed the EXISTENTIAL response pattern to the homogeneity
targets, accepting the positive homogeneity targets and rejecting
the negative ones15. The other six children who failed to compute
implicatures were a subset of the 16 children who displayed the
HOMOGENEOUS response pattern.
4.2.3. Non-randomness of Groupings
One potential concern about the groupings reported above
is that some children, having not yet acquired the relevant
construction, simply answered randomly (that is, at chance) on
the homogeneity targets or the implicatures targets, or both, and
therefore our diagnosis of a group of children with homogeneity
but no implicatures may be spurious.
Recall that there were three items per condition and
participants were categorized by their majority response. Based
on the two homogeneity target conditions (THE-SOME-POS
and THE-SOME-NEG), every participant is thus guaranteed
to fall into one of four possible groups. The fourth group
was not mentioned in the preceding discussion because it
turns out to be empty and is the least plausible from a
theoretical point of view: it would correspond to interpreting
the definite description as an existential that takes scope above
negation. Now, given that two of the six possible groups
are empty, it would be rather surprising if all six of the
homogeneous/−implicature children ended up in this group by
giving random responses, without any child ending up in one of
the two empty groups (where they could have landed just as well
by answering randomly).
To put a number on it, assume the following. Take
children’s answers on implicature targets to be non-random.
This means we can exclude the +implicature children from
consideration, since they cannot, in virtue of randomness
of their responses to homogeneity targets, end up in the
homogeneous/−implicature group. Now assume that of the 13
15Unlike the child participants, no adult displayed the EXISTENTIAL response
pattern. Not all adults computed scalar implicatures, however. We will return to
this point.
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FIGURE 7 | Within-subject mean responses on affirmative homogeneity and
implicature items for children in Experiment 1 (recall that rejection (0) on the
task corresponded to +homogeneous and +implicature responses).
−implicature children, a certain number n answered randomly
on homogeneity targets. Since the hypothesis is that the whole
homogeneous/−implicature group is spurious, the value of n has
to be at least 6. Now consider the probability, as a function of
n, that the results would be at least as extreme as they actually
are, in the following sense: at least six children are categorized
as homogeneous/−implicature, and the other children are
categorized as existential/−implicature, while the other two
possible groups are empty. (The remaining 13 − n non-random
responders fall in the existential/−implicature group in any case.)
We find that for all values of n in [6, 13], with the exception of
n = 8, p < 0.0005 (for n = 8, p < 0.001). Alternatively,
assume that the random responders answered randomly on both
homogeneity and implicature targets. We consider a result to be
at least as extreme as ours if the following is the case: at least
six children are in the homogeneous/−implicature group, no
children are in the universal or the wide-scope existential group,
and at most one child is in the existential/+implicature group.
Then for any value of n in [6, 24], p < 0.0001.
To see the point in a more visual form, consider Figure 7,
which shows individual children’s mean responses to the
positive homogeneity and implicature targets, with each
data point corresponding to an individual child. The four
corners correspond to groups: existential/+implicature
in the upper-left, existential/−implicature in the upper-
right, homogeneous/+implicature in the lower-left, and
homogeneous/−implicature in the lower-right corner. Observe
that children do, indeed, cluster into the corners nicely and
the center of the plane is empty, indicating that children’s
responses are systematic and not random, legitimizing the
binning into groups.
We may thus safely conclude that our finding is not an
artifact created by children simply giving random responses to
homogeneity targets coupled with a categorization rule that is
based on the majority response in an odd number of trials.
TABLE 2 | Predicted responses to each condition ([determiner]-[context]-[polarity])
for each of the six possible groups, defined by the reading for the definite
(EXIstential, HOMogeneous, UNIversal) and the presence or absence of
implicatures.
EXI HOM UNI
+SI −SI +SI −SI +SI −SI
THE-ALL-NEG 0 0 0 0 0 0
ALL-GAP-POS 0 0 0 0 0 0
ALL-GAP-NEG 1 1 1 1 1 1
THE-NONE-POS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOME-ALL-POS 0 1 0 1 0 1
THE-NONE-NEG 1 1 1 1 1 1
THE-GAP-POS 1 1 0 0 1 1
THE-GAP-NEG 0 0 0 0 1 1
THE-ALL-POS 1 1 1 1 1 1
4.2.4. Improved Group Assignment
The purpose of this section is to provide a more solid
underpinning for the descriptive categorization of participants
we gave above. While in the previous section, we established that
the observed group assignment is highly unlikely to be the result
of purely random responses, our child data are clearly quite noisy,
which a simple categorization based on majority response does
not take into account. This issue will become especially pressing
in Experiment 2, where the number of possible groups is much
larger. We thus performed a categorization of participants on the
basis of a statistical model of the responses.
The task is to assign a group to every participant, where
there are 6 possible groups determining (i) whether or not
the participant derives implicatures and (ii) what reading
this participant assigns to definite descriptions (HOMogeneous,
EXIstential, UNIversal). A group thus determines a theoretical
response to each condition, as described in Table 2. We fitted
logit models of the data (including both target and control
conditions), with fixed intercept and slope and a subject-
dependent group parameter as a predictor variable, varying by
subject16. The probability that a participant belongs to a given
group is then given by the posterior probability of that value of
the group parameter for that participant17.
For children, the model fitted with all six possible levels for the
group predictor indicated no mentionable posterior probability
of a universal reading of the definite plural for any child.
16The addition of varying intercepts and/or slopes in themodels led to convergence
problems and was therefore eschewed.
17Technically, the model had the form:
Ys,i ∼ bernoulli(logit−1(πs,i)), with πs,i = α + βXγ (s)i and Xgi following Table 2.
Bayesian models were fitted separately for children and adults using JAGS through
the rjags package (Plummer, 2003). The prior for the intercept parameter α was
set to a normal distribution with mean 0 and precision 0.001, while the prior for
the slope parameter β was the non-negative half of the same distribution (since
a participant cannot plausibly be more likely to judge a sentence true when it
is, in fact, false). The prior for γ (s), the group parameter of each participant
s, was uniform. 5,000 samples were drawn from each of 4 chains after 5,000
burn-in iterations.
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TABLE 4 | Estimated log pointwise predictive likelihood (elpd) and its standard
error with different available group assignments for children.
Possible groups elpd (se)
All −130.30 (15.86)
All but EXI/+SI −137.97 (15.98)
All but HOM/−SI −181.09 (15.90)
All but EXI/+SI and HOM/−SI −189.79 (15.90)
“All” groups were EXI/±SI and HOM/±SI.
The two corresponding groups were thus subsequently dropped
and the analysis was re-run with only four possible values for
the group parameter. Children were assigned to groups quite
unambiguously: the posterior probability of the group with the
highest posterior probability (maxg p(γ (s) = g|Y)) was > 0.92
for all children and > 0.99 for all except two. The result, shown
in Table 3, replicates exactly our descriptive categorization18.
One might want to evaluate more directly whether the
HOM/−SI and the EXI/+SI groups can be assumed to be
populated. To do so, we compared models which made
these groups a possibility with models which did not, using
a leave-one-out cross-validation as recommended by Vehtari
et al. (2017)19. Table 4 summarizes the obtained estimated log
pointwise predictive likelihoods. We see that models with the
HOM/−SI group perform much better than those that do not
include it (e.g., with all other groups included, 1elpd = 50.79
with se = 9.87), showing that this group is indeed populated.
In comparison, models including the EXI/+SI group outperform
their counterparts without it by only a small margin (e.g.,1elpd =
7.67 with se = 5.08).
The model for adults was also first fitted with all six groups,
followed by dropping the possibility of an existential reading
since the model was found not to make use of it. Group
assignment was again quite unambiguous20. The results are
shown in Table 5; they are qualitatively comparable to our
descriptive categorization from the previous section.
4.3. Discussion
Let us first consider the results from the adult participants. Adult
subjects were about equally split between those who did and those
18The group assignments remained the same when the model was fitted only on
the items directly relevant to homogeneity and implicatures, i.e., the items in the
THE-GAP-POS, THE-GAP-NEG, and SOME-ALL-POS conditions.
19Deviating fromVehtari et al. (2017), we did not approximate the cross-validation
by importance sampling, as it was questionable that our data set would meet the
prerequisites for this procedure.
20mins(argmaxg p(γ (s) = g|Y)), i.e., the minimal probability with which any
subject was assigned its group was 0.82. The mean was 0.96.





who did not derive scalar implicatures. This is not surprising
given that implicatures are often said not to be obligatory21 and
participants have previously been found to vary in the rate of
implicature-based responses in such tasks (see e.g., Noveck and
Posada, 2003).
As for the definite descriptions, the overwhelming majority of
adults interpreted them homogeneously and none treated them
as existential, as we would expect. In addition, a small number
of participants treated the plural definite description like a (low-
scope) universal; that is to say, in GAP situations they judged
affirmative THE-sentences false, but negated ones true.
One can think of various possible explanations for this. One is
that the definite description is really a universal for all speakers,
but some chose the wide-scope and some chose the low-scope
reading in a scopally ambiguous case, such as that of sentential
negation. Since, however, there are independent arguments for
why homogeneity is not simply universally interpreted definite
plurals taking wide scope22, this has little plausibility.
Alternatively, these particular participants might just have
a different understanding of the definite from the majority,
namely a universal as opposed to a homogeneous one. This
hypothesis would be quite testable precisely on the basis of the
arguments for a distinction between homogeneity and wide-
scope universals, since these participants would be predicted to
behave distinctly on such cases. However, we do not pursue this
question further here.
Finally, these participants might be employing a different
response strategy: instead of first computing the truth value
of the sentence in a trivalent setting and then mapping these
three truth values to two truth values to generate their response,
they might, following the intuition that negation should invert
the truth value, first compute their response for the positive
sentence and then simply reverse it to obtain the response for the
negated sentence23.
Turning to the children’s responses, recall that the first goal
of the experiment was to resolve the uncertainty surrounding
the interpretations that young children assign to plural definite
descriptions; previous studies had hinted at existential, universal,
and homogeneous possibilities, but these hints were inconclusive
due to the absence of the negative counterparts. The results
of Experiment 1 revealed two groups of children, based on
21At least not regardless of context, and participants may differ in what kind of
context they assume to obtain in the experimental situation.
22The relevant evidence comes from definite plurals embedded in non-monotonic
contexts, as well as definite plurals with a pronoun bound by a higher negative
quantifier (cf. Magri, 2014 and Križ and Chemla, 2015).
23This is equivalent to interpreting negation as weak negation (∼p is true if p is not
true) instead of strong negation (¬p is true if p is false) in a trivalent logic.
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responses to both positive and negative definite descriptions:
one group interpreted the definite descriptions existentially
(scoping under negation), while the other interpreted them
homogeneously. We had initially reasoned that a universal
interpretation would be plausible on the basis of considerations
of the input. If a child were to hear positive plural definite
descriptions exclusively in scenarios that satisfied homogeneity,
for example, that could be a strong reason to posit a universal
meaning for the definite plural. The fact that no child displayed
the UNIVERSAL pattern of response, however, suggests this is not
the case. Instead, children might be led to posit an existential
meaning for the definite plural, on the basis of its behavior under
negation, and the occasional non-maximal reading of the definite
plural (for discussion of non-maximal readings, see Brisson,
1998; Lasersohn, 1999; Malamud, 2012; Schwarz, 2013; Križ,
2015a).
Note another important finding of Experiment 1. While
non-maximal responses from children could be argued to
arise from non-adult-like domain restriction, the inclusion of
negative targets in our experiment allows us to rule out such
an explanation for their seemingly existential readings of plural
definite descriptions. If children (in our experiment as well as
in the previous experiments we’ve discussed) were to accept the
positive plural definite descriptions in a gap scenario because
they restricted the domain to the individuals that did indeed
satisfy the predicate, one would expect them to be able to accept
the negative homogeneity targets using an analogous strategy
of restricting the reference to those individuals who do not
satisfy the predicate. In essence, such ‘wildly domain-restricting’
children would interpret the positive and negative homogeneity
targets as in (19) and (20), respectively.
(19) The hearts are red.
 The hearts that are red are red.
(20) The hearts are not red.
 The hearts that are not red are not red.
The fact that the children we tested, in particular those
who accepted the positive homogeneity targets, never accepted
the negative targets, suggests that acceptance of homogeneity
violations cannot be due to non-adult-like domain restriction.
The second goal of the experiment was to investigate the
predictions of the scalar implicature account of homogeneity.
On this account, the definite plural has a literal existential
meaning, which is then strengthened to a universal meaning
through an implicature. The finding of an EXISTENTIAL
subgroup of children, who moreover lacked scalar implicatures,
is consistent with and expected on the implicature account
of homogeneity. Unable to derive the homogeneous meaning
through implicature, these children start out with judgments
based on the literal, existential meaning of the definite plural.
The implicature account also makes the further prediction,
however, that homogeneity should not be observed in the absence
of scalar implicatures. This prediction comes in two parts.
First, children who have not yet acquired scalar implicatures
should be unable to obtain homogeneous readings for plural
definite descriptions. Second, the scalar implicature from some
to not all should not occur at a lower rate than homogeneous
readings because this implicature is actually a subcomputation
of the homogeneity implicature in Magri’s theory. If anything,
homogeneity should occur at a lower rate than the regular
scalar implicature.
Even among our adult participants, roughly half were
categorized as not computing implicatures. This means that
we cannot conclude that the children who are categorized as
not deriving implicatures have indeed not yet acquired them,
since it is also possible that they simply refrain from computing
implicatures for the same reason that some of the adults do.
Consequently, our data do not speak to the first prediction
of the implicature theory. The second prediction, however, is
clearly falsified for both children and adults: in both groups, the
failure to derive scalar implicatures is more prevalent than non-
homogeneous interpretations of plural definite descriptions24.
Most strikingly, there was no group of participants who
systematically derived scalar implicatures and at the same time
failed to access homogeneous readings of definite plurals. This
suggests that there is, in fact, an alternative way of obtaining
homogeneous readings that does not rely on scalar implicatures,
and that this alternative way of generating homogeneity is
already acquired by the time children are robustly computing
scalar implicatures.
A remaining worry is that our diagnosis of universal and
homogeneous readings might be confounded by the scope of
negation. The present analysis is predicated on the assumption
that the definite plural, whatever its meaning, takes low scope
under sentential negation. However, in order to keep the
sentences and visual display simple, we had the definite plural
in the subject position of intransitive sentences, which means
that its surface scope was actually above sentential negation. If
children interpreted the definite plural as a universal in surface
scope position, i.e., with wide scope over negation, then that
would give rise to the same responses as a homogeneous meaning
in our binary judgment paradigm: both affirmative and negative
sentences with definite plurals would be judged false (i.e., non-
true) in gap situations. As there is not much of a difference in
either the mean or youngest age of participants in the existential
vs. the homogeneous group (mean 4.72 years and minimum 4.37
years vs. mean 4.73 years and minimum 4.42 years), it is possible
that some children start out with a (low-scope) existential reading
and others start out with a (wide-scope) universal reading for
the definite plural. Experiment 2 is an attempt to control for
this possibility.
Note that a wide-scope universal is not under discussion as a
possible reading of the definite plural for adults. This reduces the
plausibility of the above worry for children, and makes it entirely
inapplicable to our argument against the implicature theory on
the basis of the adult data.
24The nature of the seemingly universal responses from some adults is irrelevant
to this argument.
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5. EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to obtain a more fine-
grained picture in which truly homogeneous readings would be
distinguished from wide-scope universals. In order to do this,
what we require is a way to distinguishmerely non-true sentences
from those that are bona fide false, to which end a ternary
response paradigm has been employed for adults by Križ and
Chemla (2015). A ternary response paradigm has also been used
with children in an investigation of scalar implicatures. Katsos
and Bishop (2011) report that when given the choice between
a minimal, an intermediate, and a maximal reward option, 5-
year-old children are adult-like in consistently choosing to give
the puppet the intermediate reward for a literally true utterance
with a false implicature. We were thus hopeful that a similar
implementation of the ternary response paradigm would allow
us to shed further light on the interpretations that children assign
to plural definite descriptions.
5.1. Methods
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the CERES
(“Comité d’évaluation éthique des projets de recherche en santé
non soumis à CPP”) under approval number 2013/46. Written
informed consent was obtained from the parents or guardians
of all child participants; adult participants were tested through
an anonymous web-based survey, and had to click a button to
provide informed consent before starting the experiment.
5.1.1. Participants
We tested 24 French-speaking children (10 female) (4; 07, 04 −
6; 04, 13,M = 5; 03) at a preschool in Paris. Three additional
children did not finish the task, and another two were excluded
from analysis because they answered fewer than six of eight
control trials correctly (using the same control trials as in
Experiment 1, in which a sentence with a definite description
was made uncontroversially true or false). We also tested 25 adult
native speakers of French, recruited through the online platform
FouleFactory, at a total cost of AC38.30. All adult participants
passed the controls and were included in the analysis.
5.1.2. Procedure
Children were introduced to Boba the puppet, who interacted via
webcam. Children were told that Boba was still very little, and not
very good at paying attention. Children were then presented with
a series of pictures on a laptop computer, each containing four
objects, just as in Experiment 1. They were asked to identify the
colors of each of the four objects. The puppet was then asked to
say something about the objects, and would utter a test sentence
containing a plural definite description (e.g., les ballons “the
balloons”), an existentially quantified noun phrase (e.g., certains
ballons “some balloons”), or a universally quantified noun phrase
(e.g., tous les ballons “all the balloons”). Children had to decide
whether the puppet’s description was worth a reward of one,
two, or three strawberries. Children indicated their choices by
choosing cards with the appropriate number of strawberries on
them and placing them in a box in front of the laptop (Figure 8).
FIGURE 8 | Materials used in the ternary judgment task. Clearly false targets
were meant to elicit the minimal reward of one strawberry. Clearly true targets
were meant to elicit the maximal reward of three strawberries. Based on the
results reported in Katsos and Bishop (2011), the intermediate reward of two
strawberries was meant to correspond to underinformative targets.
Although children in this age range have been reported to
engage quite naturally with these kinds of graded reward scales
(Katsos and Bishop, 2011), some time at the beginning of the
experiment was devoted to making sure each child understood
how to use the scale. The instructions for each child included
an explanation of how to use the graded reward scale, and the
child was encouraged to explain back to the experimenter what
each reward meant, to make sure they had understood. Only
once the child showed a solid understanding of the three possible
rewards did the task begin. The instructions are provided in the
Appendix, in both French and English.
Children were tested individually away from their classrooms.
Responses were videorecorded for subsequent analysis. Children
saw two training items containing single objects (e.g., a pink
chair), followed by 26 test trials presented in one of two
pseudorandomized orders (the reverse of each other). The total
task took roughly 10–15 min for each child to complete.
Adults were tested on a web-based version of the task;
sentences were presented visually in the form of speech bubbles,
and adults indicated their responses by clicking on appropriate
buttons depicting the three reward options.
5.1.3. Materials
The materials used in Experiment 2 took essentially the same
form as those in Experiment 1, but some additional control
conditions were required because of the nature of the judgment
task. Recall that the primary goal of this experiment was to tease
apart homogeneous readings of definite descriptions from wide-
scope universals by giving participants an intermediate response
option that could be used to indicate a homogeneity violation.
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This is complicated by the fact that an intermediate response to a
homogeneity targetmay conceivably arise for any of the following
reasons:
(21) Possible sources of an intermediate reward for a positive
homogeneity target, e.g., The hearts are red in a GAP
context
a. The child interpreted the definite description
homogeneously.
b. The child interpreted the definite description
existentially (Some of the hearts are red), but didn’t
want to give the maximal reward because the
sentence was an incomplete description of the
image.
c. The child interpreted the definite description
universally (Every heart is red), but didn’t want to
give the minimal reward because the sentence was
a true description of at least part of the image.
Likewise, an intermediate reward for a negative homogeneity
target would ideally reflect a child’s sensitivity to the violation of
homogeneity. But it could arise for any of the reasons in (22).
(22) Possible sources of an intermediate reward for a negative
homogeneity target, e.g., The hearts are not red in a GAP
context
a. The child interpreted the definite description
homogeneously.
b. The child interpreted the definite description
existentially (Some of the hearts are not red), but
didn’t want to give the maximal reward because
the sentence was an incomplete description of the
image.
c. The child interpreted the definite description
universally (Every heart is not red), but didn’t want
to give the maximal reward because the sentence
was true on only one of the two possible scopal
construals.
To address these potential confounds, we included three
kinds of controls in this experiment: incomplete description
existential controls, partial truth universal controls, and scope
ambiguity universal controls. If a child did not give intermediate
responses in these conditions, then we could exclude these three
confounds as potential explanations for intermediate responses
to the homogeneity targets. The specific sentence types used
to control for these three confounds will be described in the
appropriate sections below, alongside the corresponding target
sentence types.
Plural definite descriptions. Experiment 2 included positive and
negative sentences containing plural definite descriptions, as in
(23). They were combined with different types of situations
(pictures) to form homogeneity targets, as well as clearly true and
clearly false controls.
(23) a. Les coeurs sont rouges.
“The hearts are red.”
FIGURE 9 | Image corresponding to a GAP context. The first and third hearts
are red, while the second and fourth hearts are yellow. If used on a
homogeneity target trial, this image would accompany either the positive Les
coeurs sont rouges “The hearts are red” or the negative Les coeurs ne sont
pas rouges “The hearts are not red.” If used on an incomplete description
control trial, this image would accompany the sentence Certains coeurs sont
rouges “Some hearts are red.” If associated with a partial truth control, this
image would accompany the positive Tous les coeurs sont rouges “All the
hearts are red.” Finally, if associated with a scope ambiguity control, this image
would accompany the negative Tous les coeurs ne sont pas rouges “Not all
the hearts are red.”
b. Les coeurs ne sont pas rouges.
“The hearts are not red.”
Participants received three positive and three negative
homogeneity target trials. On these target trials, they had
to judge positive and negative les “the”-NP sentences such as
(23), presented in GAP contexts in which only two of the four
objects in the image were of the color indicated in the test
sentence (Figure 9).
Participants also received four clearly true or clearly false
positive definite description controls, and four clearly true or
clearly false negative definite description controls. On these
control trials, participants heard sentences containing plural
definite descriptions just like (23), but presented in contexts that
satisfied homogeneity, i.e., where all four objects displayed were
of the same color (Figure 10). In ALL contexts, where all of the
objects shared the color indicated in the test sentence, the positive
control (23a) was associated with a maximal reward target, and
the negative control (23b) with a minimal reward target. In
NONE contexts where none of the objects had the color indicated
in the test sentence, the positive definite description (23a) was
associated with a minimal reward target, and the negative (23b)
with a maximal reward target.
Whether a definite plural control sentence was accompanied
by an ALL or a NONE picture was determined dynamically, on the
basis of children’s responses to the target trials25. This allowed
us to avoid eliciting overly long sequences of the same response
(for example, a string of successive intermediate rewards),
which otherwise could have encouraged a biased response
strategy. These controls also allowed us to ascertain that children
understood definite descriptions, and in particular could provide
minimal and maximal reward judgments appropriately when
there were no issues of non-homogeneity. Any participant who
failed to correctly answer at least six of the eight definite plural
controls was excluded from analysis.
Existential quantification conditions. Experiment 2 also
contained positive existentially quantified sentences such
25For adult participants, half of the controls involved the ALL context and half
involved the NONE context.
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FIGURE 10 | Images corresponding to the clearly true and clearly false definite plural controls. When accompanied by the ALL context image on the left, in which all
four hearts are red, the positive and negative descriptions in (23) would be associated with a maximal reward target and a minimal reward target, respectively. When
accompanied by the NONE context image on the right, in which all four hearts are yellow, the positive and negative sentences in (23) would be associated with a
minimal reward target and a maximal reward target, respectively.
as (24). They were combined with two types of situations
(pictures) to form scalar implicature targets and incomplete
description controls.
(24) Certains coeurs sont rouges.
“Some hearts are red.”
On scalar implicature trials, participants heard such sentences
in contexts where all four objects displayed were of the
mentioned color. Each participant received three such trials. As
with the homogeneity targets, we expected that if participants
computed the scalar implicatures, they would opt to give either
minimal or intermediate rewards, but not maximal rewards.
This is because although the sentences are true on their literal
meaning, the context falsifies the associated scalar implicatures.
Previous work by Katsos and Bishop (2011) suggests that
children are likely to give intermediate rewards for such cases of
underinformative descriptions.
On the incomplete description controls, participants heard
existentially quantified sentences as descriptions of GAP contexts.
For example, they would hear a sentence like (24), accompanying
the image in Figure 926. These sentences are uncontroversially
true in such contexts, but they do not offer a complete description
of the situation and here quite visibly so: a color present in the
picture is not at all mentioned in the sentence. So if a participant
gives an intermediate reward on these control trials, we may
suspect that other intermediate rewards they might give for
homogeneity targets could also be due to incomplete description
effects. Each participant received three repetitions of this control.
Universal quantification conditions. Finally, Experiment 2 also
contained positive and negative universally quantified sentences,
as in (25). These were combined with GAP contexts to form
partial truth controls and scope ambiguity controls.
(25) a. Tous les coeurs sont rouges.
“All the hearts are red.”
b. Tous les coeurs ne sont pas rouges.
“All the hearts are not red.”
Intended interpretation: “Not all the hearts are
red.”27
26This control also allowed us to ensure that the children could access adult-like
interpretations of existentially quantified sentences.
27We provide the “not all” translation here, as it more accurately reflects the most
natural interpretation of the French sentence, i.e., with negation scoping over the
universal. The “all not” translation is ambiguous in English.
On partial truth controls, positive universally quantified
sentences such as (25a) were presented in GAP contexts like
Figure 9, in which only two of the four objects were of the
color indicated in the test sentences. Each participant received
three such trials. These sentences were uncontroversially false in
GAP contexts, so if a participant gave an intermediate reward
rather than aminimal reward, we could reasonably infer that they
had a bias for rewarding the puppet for having given a truthful
description of at least part of the picture. This would then give us
reason to suspect that any intermediate responses the participant
may have given on the homogeneity targets could also have arisen
from these partial truth effects.
On scope ambiguity controls, a negative universally quantified
sentence such as (25b) was presented in a GAP context like
Figure 9. Each participant received three such trials. On the
intended interpretation, the negative sentences were true in
GAP contexts. On the other construal, on which the universal
scopes above negation, the sentences were false. If a child gave
an intermediate reward rather than a maximal reward, this
could reflect a dispreference against sentences that had at least
one false reading. In other words, the puppet would receive a
reward for saying something that had a true reading, but would
not receive the maximal reward because the utterance was not
unambiguously true. This would then give us reason to suspect
that any intermediate responses the participant may have given
on the negative homogeneity targets could also have been given
on the grounds of a scope ambiguity between a (universally or
existentially interpreted) definite description and negation28.
Summary of the materials. In all, participants received two
training items, six homogeneity targets, eight uncontroversially
true/false plural definite description controls, three scalar
implicature targets, three incomplete description controls, three
partial truth controls, and three scope ambiguity controls. The
full set of test sentences is provided in the Appendix.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Existential Quantification Conditions
Figure 11 displays the percentages of the reward types given
in the existential quantification conditions. In response to the
28Unlike the negative universal sentences in Experiment 1, the universal quantifier
here preceded the negation. Since we intended to use this condition as a scope
ambiguity control for the homogeneity targets, we wanted to ensure that the
sentences in the two conditions were as parallel as possible, in particular with
respect to the relative surface order of the quantifier and negation.
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FIGURE 11 | Percentages of the reward types given in the existential certains “some” conditions. The ALL context corresponded to the scalar implicature targets, and
the GAP context corresponded to the incomplete description controls. Minimal or intermediate rewards for existentially quantified sentences in ALL contexts were
indicative of scalar implicatures. A less-than-maximal reward for existential descriptions of GAP contexts was indicative of incomplete description effects.
scalar implicature targets, i.e., existentially quantified sentences in
ALL contexts, children gave more maximal rewards than adults,
suggesting they computed fewer scalar implicatures than adults
did. They also never gave minimal rewards on the basis of
a false implicature and were thus, in a sense, more forgiving
than adults. In response to the incomplete description controls,
i.e., existentially quantified sentences in GAP contexts, children
performed on a par with adults, generally maximally rewarding
the puppet. This suggests that incomplete description effects do
not play much of a role: children did not appear to be less
inclined to give a high reward simply because the puppet had not
described all of the objects in the picture.
5.2.2. Universal Quantification Conditions
Figure 12 displays the percentages of the reward types given in
the universal quantification conditions. In response to the partial
truth controls, i.e., positive universally quantified descriptions
of GAP contexts, both adults and children gave less-than-
intermediate rewards. The fact that children gave fewer minimal
rewards than adults in this condition could be suggestive of a
tendency to reward for partial truth.
In response to the scope ambiguity controls, i.e., negative
universally quantified descriptions of GAP contexts, adults
predominantly gave maximal rewards, which means that they
interpreted the universal as scoping under negation. Children,
on the other hand, were quite varied in their responses. While
the maximal and minimal responses correspond to one of
the readings of the sentence, intermediate responses may have
two explanations. First, the intermediate rewards could reflect
recognition of a sentence that may be construed as true, but is not
unambiguously so. Second, some children could have accessed
the surface scope interpretation of the negative sentences (All
of the hearts are such that they are not red) and rewarded the
partial truth of this sentence (which is literally false) with an
intermediate response. Given the magnitude of the proportion of
intermediate responses in this condition compared to the partial
truth controls, however, it seems implausible that the latter could
be solely responsible. Thus, it is plausible that scope ambiguity in
itself would sometimes give rise to intermediate responses.
5.2.3. Plural Definite Description Conditions
Figure 13 displays the percentages of the reward types given
in the plural definite description conditions. Adults and
children generally performed as expected in three of the four
unambiguous definite plural control conditions. In particular,
they gave maximal rewards for the positive definite descriptions
in ALL contexts (a true control) and minimal rewards for
the positive definite descriptions in NONE contexts (a false
control). They also gaveminimal rewards for the negative definite
descriptions in ALL contexts (a false control). In response to the
negative definite descriptions in NONE contexts (a true control),
however, children did not reward as maximally as adults did.
A closer examination of children’s responses and justifications
suggests this was because children did not like the fact that the
puppet’s sentence mentioned a color that none of the objects
shared. In other words, they may have seen some degree of
infelicity associated with describing what color the objects were
not, as opposed to what color they were29.
As for the homogeneity targets, children and adults again
differed in their treatment of plural definite descriptions in GAP
contexts. First, as seen in Figure 13, adults generally gave the
same responses to positive and negative homogeneity targets,
while children tended to give greater rewards for positive
homogeneity targets than for negative homogeneity targets.
Second, the two groups differed in the distribution of individual
29It is worth noting that children were target-like on the same controls in
Experiment 1. It’s not entirely clear why the ternary task should bring out the
infelicity of the negative descriptions more than the binary task. One possible
reason is that choosing from three response options instead of two was more
demanding, which could have pushed children to rely on a superficial strategy of
quickly rejecting (or “punishing” the puppet for) any sentences that they perceived
to be irrelevant. For example, they could have checked whether any of the objects
in the picture matched the color mentioned by the puppet; if not, the puppet’s
statement would quickly be rejected as irrelevant or infelicitous.
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FIGURE 12 | Percentages of the reward types given in the universal tous “all” conditions. Positive universal descriptions of GAP contexts corresponded to partial truth
controls; negative universal descriptions of GAP contexts corresponded to scope ambiguity controls. A greater-than-minimal reward for positive universal descriptions
of GAP contexts was indicative of partial truth effects. A less-than-maximal reward for negative universal descriptions of GAP contexts was indicative of scope
ambiguity effects.
participants across the different response categories. Participants
were categorized as EXISTENTIAL if they gave the maximal
reward on at least two of three positive target trials, and if
they gave the minimal reward on at least two of three negative
target trials. Participants were characterized as HOMOGENEOUS
if they gave minimal or intermediate rewards on at least two
of three positive and two of three negative target trials. Finally,
participants were categorized as UNIVERSAL if they gave the
minimal reward on at least two of three positive target trials, and
if they gave the maximal reward on at least two of three negative
target trials.
Table 6 represents the distribution of children and adults
according to their performance on the homogeneity and scalar
implicature targets30. Focusing first on the homogeneity targets,
it is apparent that children and adults differed: while 23
of the 25 adults responded in a manner consistent with
homogeneity, i.e., giving minimal or intermediate rewards to
both positive and negative definite descriptions in GAP contexts,
12 children (mean age 5;08) displayed this adult pattern and 10
children (mean age 5;00) displayed the EXISTENTIAL response
pattern, maximally rewarding the positive descriptions but
minimally rewarding the negative descriptions (χ2(2,N =
47) = 15.33, p < 0.001). Two other children gave
inconsistent responses.
Returning to the full distinctions presented in Table 6, we
can discuss the individual responses to both homogeneity and
scalar implicature targets together. We observe the same two
subgroups of children as in Experiment 1: a subgroup of
EXISTENTIAL children who failed to compute scalar implicatures,
and a subgroup of HOMOGENEOUS children, only some of whom
30Again, some would prefer an analysis that does not bin participants into
categories, but we include this discussion here to explore the possible interpretive
preferences observable in our two participant groups; as in Experiment 1,
participants turned out to align remarkably well into a subset of the possible
categories.
computed implicatures. As in Experiment 1, no child displayed
the UNIVERSAL response pattern.
Finally, we took into account the incomplete description,
partial truth, and scope ambiguity controls, in order to completely
factor out these potential biases as described above. Recall that
each participant received three repetitions of each kind of control.
A participant was considered to have a bias against incomplete
descriptions if they gave the maximal reward on fewer than two
of the three trials. A participant was considered to have a bias in
favor of partial truth if they gave the minimal reward on fewer
than two of the three trials. Finally, a participant was considered
to display a scope ambiguity effect if they gave the intermediate
response on more than one of the three trials.
In Table 7 we present the distribution of participants who
passed this maximally conservative inclusion criterion. The
remaining 21 adults and 9 children are those who we can be
reasonably certain responded to the plural definite descriptions
without any interfering or irrelevant biases. As was the case
before the exclusions, we observe mostly homogeneous adults,
and a homogeneous subgroup and an existential subgroup
for children.
5.2.4. Non-randomness of Groupings
Since the ternary judgment task involves three response options,
the number of logically possible groups, defined by how often a
participant chose which option on which of the three relevant
conditions (the two homogeneity targets THE-SOME-POS and
THE-SOME-NEG, and the implicature target SOME-ALL-POS), is
27. Nevertheless, 22 of the 24 children fall into only three of these
groups, and it is precisely the groups which, from a theoretical
point of view, correspond to the three groups in which 23 of the
24 children were found in Experiment 1. It is thus highly unlikely
that the five participants in the homogeneous/−implicature
group are there simply by virtue of giving random responses.
Since the relevant p-values are guaranteed to be much lower
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FIGURE 13 | Percentages of the reward types given in the definite les “the” conditions. True controls corresponded to positive plural definite descriptions of ALL
contexts and negative plural definite descriptions of NONE contexts. False controls corresponded to positive plural definite descriptions of NONE contexts and negative
plural definite descriptions of ALL contexts. Homogeneity targets corresponded to plural definite descriptions of GAP contexts.
TABLE 6 | Distribution of participants across response types, according to
performance on homogeneity and scalar implicature targets.
Adults Children
− Implicature + Implicature − Implicature + Implicature
Homogeneous 2 21 5 7
Existential 0 0 10 0
Universal 2 0 0 0
Two children gave inconsistent responses and are not included in the table.
than even for Experiment 1 (section 4.2.3), we do not calculate
them here.
5.2.5. Improved Group Assignment
The purpose of this section is, again, to obtain a quantitative
assessment of the preceding characterization of the data in terms
of assigning children to groups. The question we are interested
in is whether there is evidence for the existence of children with
truly homogeneous interpretations for definite plurals but who
do not compute implicatures. To this end, we will describe an
analysis that allows us to decide for each participant whether they
TABLE 7 | Distribution of participants across response types, after applying a
maximally stringent exclusion criterion that eliminated any participants who could
potentially have had a bias for partial truth, against incomplete description, or
against scope ambiguity.
Adults Children
− Implicature + Implicature − Implicature + Implicature
Homogeneous 2 18 2 2
Existential 0 0 5 0
Universal 1 0 0 0
have implicatures and what reading they assign to the definite
plural. The possible readings for the definite plurals that we
consider are the following:
EXI Low-scope existential interpretation for definite plurals (as
before).
HOM Truly homogeneous interpretation, which should lead to
an intermediate response in both positive and negative THE-
GAP conditions.
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TABLE 8 | Predicted responses to each condition ([determiner]-[context]-[polarity]) for each of the possible groups.
EXI HOM SA WS PT
+SI -SI +SI -SI +SI -SI +SI -SI +SI -SI
ALL-GAP-NEG 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SOME-GAP-POS 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
THE-ALL-NEG −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
THE-GAP-NEG −1 −1 0 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0
THE-NONE-POS −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
THE-GAP-POS 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
THE-NONE-NEG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
THE-ALL-POS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SOME-ALL-POS 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ALL-GAP-POS −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 0
SA Universal interpretation with scope ambiguity effects, which
should lead to a minimal response in the THE-GAP-POS
condition since there is no possibility for scope ambiguity
here, but to an intermediate response in the THE-GAP-
NEG condition because the sentence is either true or false
depending on where the universal takes scope with respect
to negation.
WS A strictly wide-scope universal interpretation, which should
yield minimal responses in both positive and negative THE-
GAP conditions.
PT Wide-scope universal interpretation with partial truth
effects, which should yield intermediate responses
in both THE-GAP conditions, like HOM, but should
additionally yield an intermediate response in the
ALL-GAP-POS condition (where HOM would yield a
minimal response).
We thus obtain in principle 5(EXI,HOM,SA,WS,PT) × 2(+SI,−SI)
possible groups of participants. Each of these groups corresponds
to a unique pattern of responses to the different conditions,
as described in Table 8. The upcoming analyses fit ordinal
regression models which assign each participant to a given
group, given this participant’s actual responses31. The models
may allow for different groups to be considered, and in
order to decide whether it is meaningful to say that some
participants belong to a particular group, we ask whether
models that include that group are superior to models that
do not include that group, all else being equal. One problem
is that it is not necessarily possible to reliably estimate the
relevant models with the whole dataset while considering all
31Themodels were thus similar to the ones used in the previous experiment, except
that we performed ordinal regression because the responses could now take 3, and
not only 2, values. The analysis was again performed with JAGS/rjags (Plummer,
2003). The prior for the two threshold parameters in the ordinal regression was set
to a normal distribution with mean 0 and precision 0.001, while the prior for the
slope parameter was set to the positive half of the same distribution. The prior over
the group parameter γ was uniform (over those groups which were available to the
model). Leave-one-out cross-validation was performed as before on the basis of
5,000 samples after 5,000 burn-in iterations from 4 chains, for a total of 20,000
samples per model and data point.
possible groups at once, so below we propose several analyses
which are essentially similar but differ in what assumptions
they rely on to simplify this computational limitation. In
all these analyses, we rely on the results of Experiment 1,
where only a single child was categorized as belonging to
the group EXI/+SI, in not including that group in any of
the models.
Analysis 1: no partial truth, implicatures imply homogeneity
In this analysis, we restricted the dataset to the conditions
with THE plus the implicature-relevant condition SOME-ALL-
POS. There is little reason to think that partial truth was
playing any role and, accordingly, this analysis does not consider
the possibility of a PT group (the role of PT groups is
evaluated separately in Analysis 3). Furthermore, we assume
here that every child who had acquired implicatures had
also reached an adult-like stage for homogeneity. The only
+SI group allowed in these models was thus the HOM/+SI
group. Apart from these restrictions, the models in this
analysis explore all combinations of HOM/−SI, SA/−SI, and
WS/−SI32.
Table 9 shows the estimated log pointwise predictive
likelihoods (elpd) and their standard errors for each of these
models. Overall, models that included the HOM/−SI group were
superior to those that did not, providing evidence in favor of
32Since HOM and PT do not differ on the conditions under consideration (but
only on ALL-GAP-POS, which was not included), the latter group was excluded
from the models. Note that while we did take into account the possibility of scope
ambiguity effects, we did not use the ALL-GAP-NEG data points to estimate their
prevalence. The effect of the scope ambiguity of the negative universal sentences
was very strong in that all possible responses were chosen in a sizeable percentage
of cases. Given that this is not so for negative definite description sentences, these
effects are clearlymore prevalent with the universal all, and we found that the scope
ambiguity effect with all dominated the group assignment choices of the models at
the expense of an accurate categorization on the basis of the definite description
data. In other words, the model would rather give up accuracy on the definite
description data than miss the scope ambiguity effects with all. Furthermore, there
was no a priori reason to expect the scopal behavior of different quantifiers (in
this case, definite descriptions and all) to be the same. We thus concluded that the
inclusion of these data points would hamper, rather than improve, the analysis.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 21 November 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2329
Tieu et al. Children’s Acquisition of Homogeneity
TABLE 9 | Results of leave-one-out cross-validation for Experiment 2.
Analysis 1 Analysis 2 An. 1 vs. An. 2 Analysis 3
HOM/−SI WS/−SI SA/−SI elpd (se) elpd (se) 1elpd (se) 1elpd (se)
X X −238.9 (18.0) −239.6 (18.2) 0.8 (3.6) 8.9 (4.3)
X X −240.6 (17.6) −244.8 (17.8) 4.1 (3.8) 8.8 (4.5)
X X X −241.4 (17.9) −241.6 (18.2) 0.3 (3.6) 8.3 (4.4)
X −241.5 (17.5) −249.0 (17.7) 7.5 (4.6) 9.9 (4.7)
X −247.7 (18.6) −249.3 (18.7) 1.6 (3.8) 1.2 (6.9)
X X −248.7 (18.5) −249.8 (18.7) 1.1 (3.7) 1.6 (6.8)
X −256.5 (18.2) −253.0 (18.2) −3.5 (5.2) 1.6 (6.9)
All models included groups HOM/+SI and EXI/-SI on top of those marked in the table. Models in Analysis 2 additionally included SA/+SI and WS/+SI. Models in Analyses 1 and 2 were
fitted on THE conditions plus SOME-ALL-POS. Models in Analysis 3 were fitted on the same data plus ALL-GAP-POS. The column for Analysis 3 shows the comparison of models that
included the PT/−SI with models that did not (positive numbers favor the latter).
the existence of a group of children with access to homogeneous
readings but not to implicatures33.
Analysis 2: no partial truth, no assumption that implicatures
imply homogeneity
This analysis differed from Analysis 1 in that it did not
assume that implicatures imply homogeneous readings; that is,
the groups SA/+SI and WS/+SI were systematically included in
all models as possible groups a child could fall in. The overall
picture remains largely the same, with elpds in the same range
as in Analysis 1 (Table 9), and favoring models making use of the
HOM/−SI group.
A comparison of the models from Analysis 2 to the
corresponding models from Analysis 1 (also provided in
Table 9) reveals that those from Analysis 1 actually perform
better, suggesting that the assumption in Analysis 1 that
homogeneity is systematically acquired earlier than implicatures
is warranted34,35.
Analysis 3: the role of partial truth
For Analysis 3, we are interested in evaluating the role of the
partial truth strategy. The target is thus the comparison of models
with and without PT groups. Given the results of Analysis 2, we
33The topmodel also included theWS/−SI group. It should, however, be noted that
the models are likely to overestimate the prevalence of the WS/−SI group. Both
our own adult data and the data from Križ and Chemla (2015) suggest that adults
often judge sentences as false when they are really undefined due to a homogeneity
violation. Adults do this more often than they judge the same sentences true,
and also more often than they judge a sentence with a false implicature as false
(cf. Figures 12, 13 above). Our simple ordinal regression models do not account
for this fact and therefore categorize children into the WS/−SI group even when
they are really in the HOM/−SI group, simply translating the underlying undefined
status of the sentence to a minimal response.
34The only exception was SA/−SI, which was independently the worst model. The
reason why SA/−SI is a bit better in Analysis 2 is presumably that it now has a way
of assigning children to a WS/−SI group by sacrificing fit on the implicature data:
(some) children that ought to be in WS/−SI were instead categorized as WS/+SI.
This is not possible in Analysis 1, where no WS/+SI group exists.
35If we look at how the maximal model categorizes children (by maximal posterior
probability of group), we find that only one child is assigned to SA/+SI and no child
is assigned to WS/+SI, whereas there are six participants in the HOM/+SI group. In
light of this model’s failure to perform markedly better than more parsimonious
ones, we conclude that it is probably overfitted and that the assumption that
implicatures imply homogeneity need not be given up on the basis of these results.
start over from Analysis 1, assuming that homogeneity precedes
implicatures, i.e., dropping all +SI group except HOM/+SI. In
Analysis 3, the condition ALL-GAP-POS was included alongside
the conditions used in Analysis 1, because it is now necessary to
differentiate the newly added PT/−SI group from the HOM/−SI
group. The last column of Table 9 presents a comparison of
models with a partial truth PT/−SI group with the corresponding
models without such a group. The comparison uniformly comes
out in favor of the models without PT/−SI. Hence, this analysis
provides no evidence for the existence of the PT/−SI group or, to
put it differently, in favor of the partial truth strategy.
5.3. Summary
The results of Experiment 2 replicate the essential findings of
Experiment 1 insofar as, if one were to collapse intermediate
and minimal rewards in the ternary paradigm, the resulting
picture is very similar to what we saw in Experiment 1 on
all the crucial points. Furthermore, we find that even if some
of the children who do not compute implicatures may have
a wide-scope universal reading for the definite plural (which
Experiment 1 could not distinguish from a truly homogeneous
one), there is evidence for a group with homogeneous readings
and, nonetheless, no implicatures.
6. DISCUSSION
The results of our experiments revealed, by and large, three
groups of children. The first group of children did not compute
implicatures and interpreted definite plurals as existentials (that
scope under negation). A question that is raised by this state of
affairs is the following. Children are evidently able to reach truth
conditions equivalent to those of adults for negated sentences by
recognizing that definite plurals, interpreted existentially, have
to scope under negation. But why would they hypothesize an
existential meaning in the first place when it results in truth
conditions for affirmative sentences that are so different from
those of adults?We can only offer some speculation as to how this
asymmetry might come about. It is well-known that sentences
with definite plurals are not infrequently used when there are
some exceptions, even though under scrutiny we would not
judge such sentences as strictly true. This phenomenon is known
as non-maximality (Brisson, 1998; Lasersohn, 1999; Malamud,
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2012; Križ, 2015b). An example from Lasersohn (1999) is (26),
which can be felicitously used to describe a situation in which
there are nevertheless a few insomniacs who are reading in bed
and not actually asleep.
(26) The townspeople are asleep.
While the exceptions that can be ignored by way of non-
maximality are typically few in number, in the right contexts,
non-maximal readings can effectively turn existential, such as in
this example from Malamud (2012):
(27) Context: Mary has a large house with over a dozen
windows in different rooms. She locks up and leaves to
go on a road trip with her friend Max, forgetting to close
just a few of the many windows in various rooms. A few
minutes into the ride, Max says, “There is a thunderstorm
coming. Is the house going to be OK?” Mary replies:
Oh my, we have to go back— the windows are open!
Assuming that young children do not have the interpretive
mechanisms available to simultaneously make sense of
homogeneity and non-maximality, it might be reasonable
for them to assign an existential interpretation to the definite
plural in order to be able to accommodate such non-maximal
uses. There is reportedly an asymmetry in the availability of non-
maximal readings for affirmative and negated sentences, possibly
related to the kinds of contexts in which we would use them
(Križ, 2015b). If this is correct, then children will observe much
fewer non-maximal readings of negated sentences, which could
lead them to assume that such sentences are indeed only false
when the predicate holds of none of the individuals in question.
This, they can accommodate by assuming that the existentially
interpreted definite plural has to take scope under negation36.
A second group of children was found to have already
acquired scalar implicatures as well as a homogeneous
interpretation of plural definite descriptions, and was
therefore adult-like.
Finally, a third group of children appeared to access the
homogeneous interpretation of the plural definite descriptions
without computing scalar implicatures. A closer look in
Experiment 2 suggests that some of these children actually
assign a wide-scope universal interpretation to the definite plural.
This would seem to be a natural hypothesis on the part of
these children37, since, setting non-maximality aside, the data
that are needed to distinguish this hypothesis from the correct
homogeneous reading (e.g., involving definite plurals in the scope
of non-monotonic quantifiers) are quite subtle and presumably
not all too frequent in the speech children are exposed to.
Importantly, however, there is still evidence for a group of
children who do assign adult-like homogeneous readings to
definite plurals while not computing scalar implicatures.
Given that (at least some) children start out with an existential
meaning for definite plurals, and that by the time they have
acquired scalar implicatures, they have also reached an adult-like
homogeneous meaning for definite plurals, it is tempting to
36Note that a low-scope universal reading for definite plurals is, in light of this
input, an implausible hypothesis, such that its absence in children is not surprising.
37Indeed, Caponigro et al.’s (2012) sample of plural definite descriptions in
child-directed speech is entirely associated with maximal interpretations.
think that implicatures are, in fact, the way by which they
obtain such a homogeneous meaning. This would accord exactly
with Magri’s (2014) implicature-based theory of homogeneity,
in which definite plurals are assumed to have an existential
literal meaning.
While it cannot be excluded that some children transition to
the adult-like state via the implicature theory of homogeneity, our
data provide evidence that the implicature theory is not a correct
description of the adult state itself. Since the implicature theory
requires the implicature from some to not all as a subcomputation
of the implicature that is behind homogeneity effects, it predicts
that homogeneous readings should not be more frequent than
this scalar implicature. This is inconsistent with our adult data.
If, however, as our data indicate, the implication between scalar
implicatures and homogeneity is only unidirectional even in
children (so that there are children with homogeneous definite
plurals but no implicatures), it is also not clear that the
implicature theory has a role to play in development. Rather, it
seems quite plausible that the two phenomena are independent
and that homogeneity (whatever its proper analysis) is simply
acquired earlier than scalar implicatures38.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented two experiments that tested
children’s interpretation of sentences containing plural definite
descriptions, such as the affirmative The trucks are blue and
the negated The trucks are not blue. These experiments also
included testing children’s ability to compute scalar implicatures,
and therefore allowed us to directly compare children’s
performance on the two phenomena. This in turn afforded us the
opportunity to assess the viability of scalar implicature accounts
of homogeneity.
The data from our experiments confirm previous findings
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1979; Caponigro et al., 2012) that (many)
children interpret definite plurals as existential, and extend this
existential interpretation to the context of negation, where we
find that the existential takes low scope. This corresponds to
the literal meaning hypothesized by the implicature theory of
homogeneity (Magri, 2014). However, the finding of children
(and adults) who have access to homogeneity while failing
to compute the scalar implicature that is argued to be a
sub-computation of homogeneity is incompatible with the
predictions of this theory. While we have remained agnostic as to
the nature of homogeneity in the adult grammar, our experiments
suggest that it is a phenomenon distinct from scalar implicatures
and acquired earlier by children.
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